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THE DETECTION OF FRAUDS
Frauds in connection with accounts are very prevalent,
and their detection is one of the most important functions of the professional accountant.
During the course of over twenty years' active practice, the writer has come in contact with innumerable
instances of fraud of every description, and it will be
his endeavor in the succeeding paragraphs to outline the
different kinds most usually encountered, how they can
be detected, and what methods should be adopted to
prevent them.
Frauds in connection with accounts may be, broadly
speaking, divided into two classes:
(a) Those perpetrated with the object of concealing
theft.
(b) Those which do not involve theft, but which are
committed with the object of showing a false
financial condition.
FRAUDS INVOLVING THEFT

Theft on the part of persons having the custody of
cash or securities cannot, of course, be entirely prevented, but by a good system of supervision and audit
its detection can be absolutely assured.
There is, however, a firmly ingrained idea among business men that a clever bookkeeper can hoodwink them
no matter what precautions may be taken to prevent his
doing so. This attitude is not only fatalistic but criminal. For the sake of his employees, just as much as
for his own, an employer ought to place such safeguards
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around the handling of his funds and of his records as
will reduce to a minimum even the temptation to dishonesty ; when he fails to do this, he fails in his duty to
the community, and should one of his employees yield
to temptation and steal from him, he himself is to a
great extent morally responsible for his employee's
wrongdoing.
In large commercial offices, it is possible to organize
such a system of check upon the work of all employees
as, in the absence of collusion between two or more of
them, will bring to light irregularities within a short
time after their occurrence; but in smaller offices where
the cash and the books of account are handled by the
same individual, fraud is, of course, more difficult of
detection.
Periodical audits by professional accountants are
always desirable however good in theory may be the
internal system of check upon employees. The experience of the writer has been that unless supplemented by
an audit by professional auditors, a business house's
own internal audit is likely to become perfunctory and
slipshod. Besides this, employees are likely to become
too well acquainted with one another, to rely too much
on one another's honesty, and also to be overawed too
easily by their departmental heads or other business
superiors on whose good will their promotion to a large
extent depends.
FRAUDS BY RECEIVING CASHIERS

Let us assume that a cashier whose cash on hand was
counted and found correct at January 1, 1916, has subsequently stolen some of his employer's money, and by
a series of typical examples of gradually increasing
complexity illustrate the different ways in which he
might have abstracted the money, the methods he might
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adopt to cover up his shortage, and the ways in which
his defalcation should be discovered.
Example 1
FAILURE TO DEPOSIT I N BANK ACCOUNT

Assume that the cashier acts as receiving cashier only
and has access to no books of account other than his own
Cash Book; assume further that he has properly entered
in his Cash Book all monies received by him and has
correctly totaled his Cash Book but has deposited in the
bank less than he has received to the extent of $30,000.00
during the eleven months ending November 30, 1916.
I t is obvious that in this extremely simple instance, if
his employers were to obtain a statement from their
bankers of the amounts deposited from J a n u a r y 1 to
November 30, the difference between their total and the
total of the Cash Book should represent cash still in the
hands of the cashier on November 30, and to the extent
that he cannot produce cash to that amount he is
" s h o r t , " thus:
Balance on hand, January 1, 1916
(As checked and found correct)
$
1,400.00
Total receipts, January 1—November 30,
1916, as per Cash Book
2,400,000.00
$2,401,400.00
Bank deposits, January 1—November 30,
1916, as per hank statement
2,370,700.00
Cash to be accounted for by cashier
Cash actually found to be on hand

$

30,700.00
700.00

Shortage

$

30,000.00
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Observe that in this instance fraud can scarcely be
said to have been committed. It is a simple case of theft
unaccompanied by falsification of the books.
Example 2
FALSIFICATION OK TOTALS

Now suppose that the other circumstances being the
same as in Example 1, the cashier had falsified the
total of his Cash Book to the extent of the amount of
his shortage from time to time. What would be the
result!
In the first instance, comparison of the totals of his
Cash Book with a bank statement would indicate no
irregularity, and the cash actually found on hand would
appear to be the amount to bo accounted for; thus an
employer who took no further steps than these to check
up his receiving cashier's accounts would fail to discover
the shortage.
However, since the books of account are presumably
kept by double entry, the falsification of the Cash Book
totals would have to be made after the posting thereof
had been made to the General Ledger (if a cash account
were carried in the General Ledger, or after the totals
have been transferred to a "General Cash Book" if the
General Cash Book balance were treated as entering
into the trial balance direct), as otherwise the books of
account would be out of balance to the extent of the
shortage. Comparison of the Receiving Cash Book
totals with the General Ledger (or General Cash Book
as the case might be) would therefore disclose discrepancies which in the aggregate would equal the shortage
of $30,000.00.
This illustrates the importance of an employer's
insisting on having presented to him at the close of
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each month a reconciliation statement between the balance shown by the monthly statement furnished to him
by his banker and the balance called for by his books
of account in some such form as the following:
(a) Balance as per Cash Book, November 30,
1916
$93,500.00
AM:
Checks entered in Cash Book
as paid out, but which have
not yet been presented at
Bank:
No. 8079
.$ 75.00
No. 0642
125.00
No. 9655
80.00
No. 9656
20.00
300.00
$93,800.00
(b) Balance as per bank statement, November 30, 1916
63,100.00
(c) Balance in hands of cashier, November
30, 1916
$30,700.00

At the time he examines this statement, he should
satisfy himself that as regards (a) the balance does
actually agree with the Cash Book and also with the
Trial Balance Sheet drawn off from the General Ledger.
(In the case just considered the Cash Book would have
called for only $700.00 on hand, but the trial balance
would have called for $30,700.00.) He should satisfy
himself as regards (b) that the figures agree with the
statement rendered by the bank and that such statement
shows no signs of alteration or erasures. As regards
(c) he should actually count the cash in the hands of
the cashier or else depute the task to some reliable
employee other than the cashier.
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If an employer or trusted employee other than one
of the cashiers or the bookkeeper goes through this procedure each month, no defalcation such as the one just
considered could escape detection for more than thirty
days.
Example 3
FAILURE TO ENTER RECEIPTS IN CASH BOOK

Now still assuming that the receiving cashier has
access to no books of account other than his own Cash
Book, suppose that he collects currency and checks from
the firm's customers from time to time aggregating in
all $30,000.00, which he fails to enter in his Cash Book
and uses for his own purposes.
This is the commonest form of fraud by a receivingcashier. He gets into debt and "borrows" a relatively
small sum in the first instance out of his employer's
money, meaning to replace the amount in a few days;
he is unable to replace the amount for some time, and
finding that the theft has not been noticed, he is tempted,
instead of replacing the original amount abstracted, to
take more. Almost invariably when such defalcations
are discovered, it is found that the cashier has been
gambling or speculating with the money, expecting
eventually to make good his shortage out of his winnings.
Now in an instance of this kind none of the procedures
previously referred to will bring the defalcation to light.
The books of account will balance correctly, and the
bank reconciliation statement will be in order.
If, however, the cashier entirely omits to enter in his
Cash Book the collections from customers which he has
misappropriated, it will not be long before one of two
things happens, viz.:
(a) As statements of account would in the ordinary
course of business be made out monthly and sent
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to the firm's customers by someone other than the
cashier, complaints as to the inaccuracy of such
statements will begin to come in from those customers who have made payments for which they
have not been given credit on the statements sent
them.
(b) The firm's credit department will notice that certain customers' accounts are in arrears and begin
to write them dunning letters.
In both cases, (a) and (b), inquiry will be aroused
and the fraud detected.
Example 4
W I T H H O L D I N G RECEIPTS OF ONE DATE TO MAKE GOOD
SHORTAGES OF EARLIER DATES

Suppose, however, that all circumstances were the
same as in Example 3, except that instead of omitting
to enter amounts collected in his Cash Book, the cashier
simply defers doing so until some days after the collections in question were actually made. It would be quite
possible for him to conceal a considerable shortage for
a long time, unless the auditing procedure, which will be
explained later, is gone through at frequent intervals.
His daily bank deposits would agree with the daily
totals of his Cash Book, and by reason of the very
slight discrepancies in dates as between the monthly
statements sent to customers and those shown by the
customer's own records, suspicion would not in all probability be aroused. If, for example, a customer writes
in to complain that a payment made by him on May 27
was not credited on his May statement and, on looking
into the matter, the credit department finds that the
amount in question is entered in the Cash Book on, say,
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June 1, it would probably be assumed that some delay
had occurred in the mails, and nothing further would
be done about the matter.
In order to operate a fraud of this kind successfully,
however, it would, of course, be necessary on June 1,
the date when the cashier did finally enter as a receipt
the collection that he had misappropriated, for him to
deposit in the bank the like amount of cash, and he
would therefore have to withhold from entry as a receipt
on June 1 some other collection made that day of an
equal or greater amount, otherwise he would be making
good the shortage, which is the very thing that he is
seldom in a position to do. Furthermore, as his shortage increases, the larger will be the number of items
that he must defer entering each day, and eventually
he will get to a point where it will be very difficult for
him to abstract any further monies without seriously
risking discovery.
Such a fraud is most easily operated where a number
of the receipts are in the form of currency. It is a
matter of some risk and difficulty for a cashier to obtain
payment for his own purposes on a check made payable
to the firm for which he works, although by means of
forged indorsements it is not by any means impossible.
I t is also, of course, easier to work a fraud of this kind
where the individual receipts are of large denominations, as it would then be necessary to manipulate only
a relatively few items at any one time.
An illustration of how a fraud of this kind is operated
is as follows:
On January 5 the cashier receives from customers in
all, say, $6,500.00. Included in this amount is the remittance of Mr. Smith for $231.50, which is in the form of
currency. The cashier properly enters in the Cash Book
all the individual items received, with the exception of
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the remittance of Mr. Smith, which he keeps for his own
use, and deposits in the bank $6,268.50.
On January 9 the cashier receives from customers,
say, $4,000.00. He realizes that it is now time that he
should account for the remittance of Mr. Smith which
he stole on January 5; so he enters it as a receipt on
January 9, but withholds from entry from the receipts
of January 9 an amount of $295.00 received on that day
in currency from Mr. Robinson, depositing in the bank
$3,936.50, the entries in his Cash Book being made up as
under:
Receipts of January 9
Less: Robinson's remittance

$4,000.00
295.00
—

$3,705.00
Add: Smith's remittance of January 5, not
previously accounted for

231.50

Amount entered in Cash Book and deposited
in bank
$3,936.50

Such frauds involve a continual robbing of Peter to
pay Paul, but so long as the fraud is confined to currency items, it is almost impossible to detect except by
accident. The moment, however, the cashier begins to
appropriate checks, he lays himself open to immediate
detection. To carry the foregoing example a little further, suppose that on January 15 the receipts from customers aggregate $5,000.00 but do not happen to contain
any currency items, and further suppose that the cashier
finds it very desirable that Mr. Robinson's remittance
should now be accounted for besides also finding himself
in need of some more money. He, therefore, enters the
Robinson item as received on January 15, but withholds from entry the check of Mr. Brown for $800.00.
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His bank deposit for J a n u a r y 15 would, therefore, be
$4,495.00, and the entries in his Cash Book will be
arrived at as under:
Receipts of January 15
Less: Brown's check

$5,000.00
800.00
$4,200.00

Add: Robinson's remittance of January 9, not
previously accounted for

295.00
$4,495.00

Now suppose that on J a n u a r y 20 the receipts of that
day are $7,000.00 and that the cashier, fearing to withhold the Brown item from his Cash Book any longer,
enters it as a receipt on that day, but to offset this withholds from entry a check received from Mr. Hoover for
$600.00, a check from Mr. Green for $150.00, and currency received from Mr. Astor for $50.00. His deposit
will be, of course, $7,000.00, and the amount entered in
his Cash Book will be arrived at as under:
Receipts of January 20

$7,000.00

Less:

Hoover check.
Green check
Astor cash

$600.00
150.00
50.00

800.00

$6,200.00
Add: Brown's remittance of January 15, not
previously accounted for

800.00
$7,000.00

Now though the amount of his Dank deposit and the
total of his Cash Book receipts on January 20 will thus
be in agreement, comparison of the individual items
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entered in the Cash Book with the individual items
appearing on his bank deposit slip will reveal the fact
that they are not identical, i. e., the Hoover, Green, and
Astor items will form part of the bank deposit, whereas
no such items will appear in the Cash Book; on the
other hand, the Brown item will appear in the Cash
Book, but the bank deposit slip will not show any such
item as having been deposited. I t is only by comparison
of the details of the bank deposits with the details of
the Cash Book receipts of the same day that frauds of
this sort can be promptly detected. The importance of
having such comparisons made at frequent intervals by
an auditor or some trusted employee other than the
cashier is therefore apparent, and every well-organized
concern provides for this being done. It is not necessary that such comparisons be made every day, as the
same moral effect on the cashier will be obtained if he
knows that it will be done once or twice during the
month at irregular intervals.
It is well to emphasize in this connection the extreme
importance of insisting that a cashier shall deposit the
whole of his receipts each day and that he shall not be
allowed to make change or cash checks out of his
receipts, as otherwise it becomes impossible to detect a
fraud of the character outlined above by the means
indicated.
Example 5
OVERSTATEMENT OF DISCOUNTS

A rather clumsy form of theft that is sometimes
resorted to by a cashier consists of overstating the
amount of cash discount allowed to a customer and
of understating the amount of the customer's remittance
when making the Cash Book entry in regard thereto.
He then deposits in the bank the amount of the remit-
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tance as shown by his Cash Book and pockets the difference between that amount and the sum actually
remitted by the customer.
In order to obtain any considerable sum of money in
this way, it is necessary for a cashier to falsify a very
large number of items, and as this would be almost
certain to involve remittances made by checks, frauds
of this kind can be detected by comparison of the details
appearing on the bank deposit slips with the Cash Book
in the manner described under Example 4.
Such frauds can, of course, also be readily detected
b y checking the rates of discount, and this should always
be done, as quite apart from fraud, mistakes are very
likely to occur in this connection.
F R A U D S BY P A Y I N G CASHIER

The examples hitherto considered (1 to 5) have all
dealt with frauds on the part of receiving cashiers.
Frauds by paying cashiers are, however, just as frequently encountered, and the succeeding examples will
deal with some of the most usual types.
Example 6
FALSIFICATION OF TOTALS

The simplest conceivable fraud by a paying cashier
consists in overstating the footings of his Cash Book.
This may be done to conceal the abstraction of currency
in cases where he is allowed to handle cash or to conceal the fact that he has not entered in his Cash Book
certain checks drawn by him and on which he has personally obtained payment in cases where he does not
handle currency.
A fraud of this kind cannot be carried on for long if
all items are posted individually from the Cash Book
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to the Ledger, as in such a case the overstatement of
the totals will result in throwing the General Ledger out
of balance to the extent of the overstatement. Cash
Books, however, often contain analysis columns into
which are entered under appropriate headings the most
common items of expense (e. g., salaries, traveling
expenses, etc.), and the totals only of such analysis
columns are posted to the Ledger. "Where this is the
case, both the grand total column and one of the analysis
colunms totals would, of course, be overstated by the
defrauding cashier, and as the grand total column represents a credit to Cash Account in the General Ledger
and as the analysis column total would be posted to the
debit of a General Ledger account, the books would not
be thrown out of balance.
Frauds of this kind can, of course, be discovered by
the simple process of checking the Cash Book additions,
but it must be noted that unless this is done, the mere
fact that the total of the disbursements as shown by the
Cash Book agrees with the total of the withdrawals from
the bank as shown by the bank statement at the end of
the month is no guarantee of the accuracy of the Cash
Book. For example, suppose a cashier whose monthly
salary is $175.00 draws his own salary check in duplicate, cashes both checks at the bank, but enters the item
only once in his Cash Book overstating the total of the
page on which the items appear, however, to the extent
of $175.00. The result will be that the Cash Book total
and the total of the bank withdrawals as per the bank
statement will agree, and the fraud can be discovered
only by checking the Cash Book totals or by comparing
the canceled checks returned by the bank in detail with
the Cash Book.
This illustrates the folly of an employer who fails to
have the clerical accuracy of his cashier's work checked
over either by outside auditors or by members of his
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own staff. The writer has encountered innumerable
instances where money has been systematically stolen
for a considerable period of time by the means just
described.
Example 7
DUPLICATION OF PAYMENTS

Most business houses take the precaution of requiring
several responsible employees to initial as correct the
invoices or other documents supporting any disbursement, and the treasurer or other official of the company
who actually signs checks is required to see that this
has been done before he attaches his signature to the
check. He himself should also initial the invoices or
otherwise mark them as having been produced to him
in support of a check which he has signed, otherwise he
has no guarantee that the same documents may not be
produced to him over and over again and several checks
thus be obtained for the same item, only one of which
may be turned over to the creditor in question, the
cashier forging indorsements on the others and paying
them into his own bank account or that of a confederate.
If a regular and detailed audit of the concern's affairs
is made, it would eventually be noticed that certain of
the checks were not supported by proper vouchers, as
of course there would be in existence only one genuine
set of invoices, etc., to support the bona fide payment to
the creditors and the bogus payments which had been
misappropriated by the cashier. In the meantime, however, if the cashier has obtained possession of the canceled checks which bore his forged indorsements and
has destroyed them, it would be almost impossible to
convict him of fraud, however strong the circumstantial
evidence might be. All that could be proved would be
that the checks and the invoices in support of certain
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payments were missing from the files. In such a case
it is extremely hard to prove, to the satisfaction of a
jury, who indorsed the lost checks and who is responsible for their disappearance.
Furthermore, unless the invoices are initialed or
otherwise identified as having been paid by the party
signing the check, if as is frequently the case, the cashier
has the custody of or access to the files containing old
invoices and vouchers, it is possible for him to take out
an invoice dated, say, May 14, 1916, and by merely altering it to read May 14, 1917, to supply himself with a
document which on its face would appear perfectly in
order as the supporting evidence for a check and not
only would deceive his employer, but in all probability
would pass the scrutiny of professional auditors.
Example 8
PAY-BOLL FRAUDS

Frauds in connection with pay rolls are of very frequent occurrence. Where, as is often the case, the cashier
makes up the pay roll and also pays off the men, it is
easy for him to include the names of fictitious employees
and misappropriate the wages credited to them. It is
also not uncommon for a cashier to overstate the hours
worked or the rates of pay of actual employees and to
pocket the difference between the amount which appears
on the pay roll as due to them and the true amount of
their wages which he actually turns over to them.
It is, therefore, very important that pay rolls should
be audited by comparison with time-clock cards, timekeeper's and foremen's reports, or other records independent of those kept by the paying cashier.
It must also be remembered that collusion between a
cashier and foremen or other employees is more liable
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to occur in connection with wages than in any other way
and that it is therefore desirable occasionally to supplement the checking of one book record with another by a
little practical detective work. The writer well remembers the investigation of a pay roll some years ago by
his office, where it transpired that a certain " A . B r u i n , "
who had been drawing modest but regular wages for
some weeks, was, as a matter of fact, a brown bear
which one of the workmen had brought home from a
hunting trip and which had been adopted as a sort of
mascot by the workpeople, some one of whom had
devised this ingenious plan for paying for its board
and transportation. Everybody seemed to know about
its being on the pay roll except the proprietor of the
business.
FRAUDS BY CASHIERS HANDLING BOTH
RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS

In the examples already given, the writer has assumed
that the businesses concerned were of sufficient magnitude to warrant the employment of different persons to
handle receipts and payments.
Many concerns, however, are for the sake of economy
obliged to entrust the handling of both receipts and payments to the same individual, and where this is done,
the opportunities for fraud on the p a r t of the cashier
are enormously increased. He can, of course, perpetrate
any or all of the types of fraud already described and
in addition many others. The following is an instance.
Example 9
WITHHOLDING CHECKS TO BALANCE SHORT-DEPOSITS

Suppose in any particular month a cashier draws a
check in favor of one of the firm's creditors for, say,
$1,200.00, enters it as paid on the payment side of his
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Cash Book but does not mail it to the creditor, and at
the same time deposits in the bank $1,200.00 less than
his actual receipts for the month. What is the result!
The cashier has obtained $1,200.00 for his own use, and
yet the balance shown by his Cash Book will agree with
the balance shown by the bank's statement, and the
accounts of both creditors and debtors in the Ledgers
will appear to be in order. The fraud will, therefore,
not come to light until the creditor whose check was not
mailed to him complains of not having received payment, unless the canceled checks returned by the bank
and the deposits recorded in the bank statement are
compared in detail with the Cash Book. The importance of going through this procedure is therefore very
evident, and this example once more illustrates the
necessity of auditing a cashier's transactions in considerable detail.
It may be pointed out that in many businesses where
individual transactions are, for large amounts and where
it is customary to make payments to creditors " o n
account" it would be quite possible to hold back checks
intended for creditors in the manner described above
for several months without exciting their suspicion, particularly so if the cashier were to call upon them or
write to them on his firm's letter paper, giving some
reasonable excuse for the delay.
FRAUDS BY CASHIERS W H O

Also A C T AS BOOKKEEPERS

Many small business houses, of course, entrust the
keeping of all their books to a single individual. Where
this is the case, the opportunities for fraud are almost
unlimited, unless very strict supervision is exercised by
the proprietor or a rigorous audit is made a t frequent
intervals. This is especially so because his control of
the bookkeeping gives him every conceivable opportunity for making any falsification of his accounts that
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may be necessary to conceal his defalcations. In addition to all the types of fraud previously described, such
a bookkeeper-cashier could among others perpetrate the
following.
Example 10
DIRECT LEDGER ENTRIES TO CONCEAL T H E F T

A bookkeeper-cashier having received a payment from
Mr. Brown, a customer of the firm, keeps the money for
his own use, makes no entry in regard to it in the Cash
Book, but credits Mr. Brown's personal account in the
Ledger and at the same time charges an expense account
in the Ledger with the same amount. In this case the
customer's Ledger account will be correct; the Cash
Book balance will agree with that shown by the bank
statement, and the books of account will be in trial balance. The only way in which the fraud could be discovered would be by checking the detailed postings to
the Ledger, whereupon it would develop that both a
credit and a debit for the like amount, the one affecting
a personal account and. the other an expense account,
could not be traced to the books of original entry.
Example 11
J O U R N A L ENTRIES TO CONCEAL T H E F T

I t is the writer's experience that employers are astonishingly careless about scrutinizing the journal entries
which go through their books, and seem to think they are
"just book entries" and, therefore, only of academic
interest.
A bookkeeper-cashier can, however, very easily make
journal entries crediting the account of persons whose
remittances he has misappropriated and charging impersonal accounts such as Allowances or Returned Goods
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with similar amounts. In such cases everything will
apparently be in order, and unless the proprietor or the
auditor examines the journal entries in detail very carefully, the frauds will escape detection.
Example 12
POSTINGS TO WRONG ACCOUNT

Again by means of posting such items as salaries,
postage, rent, etc., to wrong accounts in the General
Ledger it is possible for a bookkeeper-cashier to make
payment of the same item more than once, misappropriating the duplicate payment for his own purposes, and yet to make it appear from a cursory
scrutiny of his Ledger accounts as though everything
were in order. In such cases only a careful analysis
of all the impersonal Ledger accounts or the detailed
checking of all postings will reveal the fraud.
FRAUDS BY STOREKEEPERS AND OTHERS
HAVING CUSTODY OF MATERIALS

The concealment of theft of material by means of
falsification of the books of account is less frequent
than the case of theft of money, not because of any
greater difficulty in manipulating the records in such
cases, but because of the practical difficulty of removing
the actual merchandise in question without detection.
In manufacturing businesses, however, where raw
material of high intrinsic value is used, such as ingot
tin or platinum, it is very important that materials
should be issued from stores only on the authority of
requisitions signed by responsible employees and that
the storekeeper's receipts and deliveries of material be
checked up at frequent intervals with the purchase
invoices and the signed requisitions for withdrawals.
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It is also very important in such cases that a. good
system for recording manufacturing costs be in use so
that theft on the p a r t of those requisitioning material
from stores will be indicated by the increased cost of
manufacture shown by the books as a result of such
theft.
Unless the precautions mentioned are taken, it is, of
course, quite easy for the storekeeper to enter in his
records as having been issued for manufacturing purposes material which he has stolen.
I t should also be remembered that unless a good system of internal check is in use, it is always possible for
the head of the purchasing department to order material
in the name of his employers but cause it to be delivered
elsewhere than at his employer's place of business (e. g.,
such materials as coal, lumber, etc., the identity of which
is easily lost). Frauds of this last-mentioned character
can be detected only by careful comparison of receiving
records with purchase invoices. It is important that
such comparisons should be made by an employee whose
regular duties are not connected with the stores department or the purchasing department.
FBAUDS COMMITTED WITH OBJECT OF SHOWING
FALSE FINANCIAL CONDITION B U T W H I C H
Do NOT INVOLVE THEFT

Frauds of this character are of far greater importance, of greater variety, and of graver consequence
than those committed for the purpose of concealing
theft. Thefts capable of being concealed by the falsification of accounts rarely involve cases of such magnitude as to ruin a business absolutely as, where really
large sums of currency are involved, sooner or later the
resultant shortage of working capital and the consequent inability of the concern to meet its current lia-
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bilities, in spite of the fact that its Profit or Loss
Account shows it to be making money, will lead to
investigations which will bring the shortage to light.
On the other hand, falsification of accounts with the
object of showing a financial condition not in accordance with the facts invariably involves very considerable
sums of money, and on account of the fact that the proprietor of the business himself or at any rate someone
occupying a high official position in the concern is usually responsible for the fraud, its existence will come to
light only as the result of investigations set on foot by
someone not actively connected with the management of
the business in question.
Example 13
FALSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WITHOUT
CORRESPONDING FALSIFICATION OF BOOKS
OF ACCOUNT

The simplest type of fraud of this sort consists in
the presentation to bankers, stockholders, investors, or
others of statements which purport to show the financial
condition of a business on a particular date or of its
earnings for a particular period, but which do not represent the facts and are not in accordance with the
books of account.
Bankers are the most frequent victims of this kind
of fraud, and bitter experience has now led them almost
invariably to insist that the financial statements submitted to them as a basis of the extension of credit be
certified as correct by reputable public accountants.
Such frauds can, of course, be immediately detected
by comparison of the statements in question with the
books of account. In spite of this it is remarkable how
frequently such frauds are practiced, the reason, of
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course, being that they can be committed without anyone's having knowledge of them except the persons who
actually commit the frauds, whereas if the books of
account are "doctored" to correspond with the statements, it is quite possible that some intelligent employee
will observe the fact and inform the parties about to be
defrauded of what has been done. Frauds of this type
have, however, only their simplicity to recommend them
and have the great disadvantage from the point of view
of the persons committing them that responsibility for
them can be directly traced to their perpetrators with
uncomfortable consequences.
Example 14
UNDERSTATEMENT

OR OVERSTATEMENT

OP

INVENTORIES

The falsification of merchandise inventory figures is
one of the most favorite vehicles of fraud on the part
of those wishing to show a false financial condition.
The reason for its popularity is the fact that it is
generally impossible from a scrutiny of the books of
account or even by means of a detailed audit to determine, except inferentially, what should be the value of
the merchandise on hand at any particular date. Moreover, as the character of the merchandise changes from
day to day, any attempt to check up the accuracy of
the values claimed on one date by comparison with
the values ascertained by means of an independent
appraisal at a later date involves considerable time
and expense and is somewhat inconclusive in its results.
Besides this, frauds of this character can be committed in such a way as to make it almost impossible
to fix responsibility of its commission. If it is assumed
that it is actually the proprietor who is morally responsible for the inflation of an inventory, he can none the
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less readily cause the actual clerical work involved in
the compilation of the figures to be performed by others
without their realizing that anything fraudulent is in
contemplation. An inventory usually involves the cooperation of quite a number of employees, and in the
process of counting quantities, pricing them, copying drafts, and making final typed statements there is
ample opportunity for an employer to inject figures and
quantities, responsibility for the insertion of which it
will afterwards be impossible to trace.
In this connection it is well to point out that it is not
always the proprietor or the general manager of a business who is interested in the falsification of inventory
figures. Very often departmental managers, factory
superintendents, or even foremen are partially remunerated upon the basis of the earnings of the business; in
such cases the proprietor should exercise great caution
in supervising the taking of inventories, otherwise he
may find that he has paid large commissions based on
nonexistent profits in respect of a particular year to
employees who have since left his service.
Example 15
INFLATION

OF ACCOUNTS

RECEIVABLE

It is sometimes sought to show a better financial
condition and to improve the earnings of a particular
period by passing through the books of account a number of fictitious sales. In such cases this is generally
done at the very end of the financial year, and the sales
in question are written back early in the succeeding
financial year so that the fraudulent condition of the
books only exists for a few days or weeks at the most.
Such a fraud, if committed in connection with the
affairs of a concern of any magnitude, can hardly be
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d o n e without the knowledge of some of the employees
of the concern involved and is, therefore, a very dang e r o u s procedure; but where a smaller business is in
question, it can be done with far less chance of its being
discovered, owing to the more lax system of internal
organization which usually exists.
Comparison of shipping records with Sales Books will
disclose frauds of this kind, and professional auditors
do this to the extent of making selective tests in order
to satisfy themselves that no such fraud is being
committed.
Example

16

CONCEALMENT OF LIABILITIES

T h e deliberate omission of liabilities from books of
account is often a very difficult thing to detect.
W h e r e trade liabilities are in question it should, theoretically, be possible to detect their omission by checking receiving records to ascertain that liabilities have
been set up for all goods received, and here again
auditors are accustomed to make selective tests along
these lines. Anyone who has had extensive experience
of commercial affairs will, however, realize that the.
t a s k is too laborious to admit of its being performed
exhaustively and that owing to the poor shape in which
receiving records are generally kept, it is not an easy
matter.
(Perfectly innocent mistakes are frequently
m a d e by really well-organized business concerns by
including in their merchandise inventory goods which
h a v e been received and taken into stock but credit for
which, for one reason or another, has not at the date
of such inventory been given, on the books of account,
to t h e creditors who supply the goods.)
W h e r e the liabilities omitted, however, represent bank
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loans and where the proceeds of such loans have never
been brought on to the books of account, it is almost
impossible for an auditor to discover their omission.
An actual example of this sort came under the notice
of the writer comparatively recently. The treasurer
and the manager of a large corporation engaged in the
grain business borrowed a very considerable sum of
money in the name of their company from bankers with
whom the company did not usually have dealings. They
signed the company's name to notes for the amount borrowed and paid the proceeds into a special bank account.
They then proceeded to engage in speculative deals on
their own account, operating them through the special
bank account in question. Their speculations were
unsuccessful, and they were unable to meet the notes
given to the banks at maturity. The notes were
renewed two or three times, but eventually the bankers
insisted on payment, whereupon the whole circumstances
of the transaction came to light.
These men were authorized to pledge the credit of
their company and had done so in this instance. In
submitting financial statements to the company's bankers, however, the liability for these notes was not disclosed; no entries appeared on the company's books in
regard to them and it would, therefore, have been impossible for anyone to detect their existence by an audit
of the books however searching. Frauds of this character are occasionally discovered through the parties
committing them by their making interest payments connected with the suppressed liabilities out of the regular
bank account of the business. Where this is so, an
analysis of the Interest Account would indicate to an
auditor that interest had been paid in connection with
liabilities not appearing on the books. The perpetrators
of such a fraud would generally, however, have the fore-
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sight to meet the interest on such bank loans out of their
own funds, and the auditors would therefore encounter
nothing to arouse their suspicions.
Example 17
OVERSTATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND PROPRIETOR'S
WITHDRAWALS

I t is not by any means uncommon for the proprietor
of a retail business who is contemplating selling out
b i s business to manipulate his records so as to show
a n earning capacity considerably in excess of what is
actually the case. One of the favorite methods adopted
for accomplishing this result is to ring up on the cash
register a number of fictitious sales.
Suppose the proprietor of a store rings up on
t h e register $50.00 more than was actually received
for each day during a particular week and enters
these inflated totals in his Cash Book. He, of course,
will have recorded earnings of $300.00 in excess of
w h a t was really taken in from customers. If he, to
offset this, enters on the payment side of the Gash
Book personal withdrawals of like amount, it is obvious
t h a t his books of account will on the face of things
a p p e a r to be correct. That is to say, the balance shown
b y his bank statement will agree with that shown by
his Cash Book, and an auditor comparing the register
readings with the Cash Book would find them in agreement. Inasmuch as nearly all the receipts of a store
a r e in the form of currency, the fact that the daily
bank deposits did not agree with the amounts shown
i n the Cash Book would not excite any particular
suspicion on the p a r t of auditors, it being reasonable
to suppose t h a t the proprietor would withhold from
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the cash receipts whatever money he needed for his
own use.
The only way in which a fraud of this sort can be
discovered is by comparison of the percentage which
the cost of goods sold bears to the sales during the
period under investigation with similar percentages for
other periods and other concerns in the same line of
business. Should it be found that an abnormal gross
profit had apparently been earned, suspicion would, of
course, be aroused. The fact that a proprietor appears
to have been withdrawing for his own use more money
than usual and more than should be necessary for his
current expenses should always arouse suspicion on
the part of an auditor.
CONCLUSION"

It would, of course, be possible to give a great many
more examples of how books of account can be fraudulently manipulated, but enough have been instanced to
demonstrate that investors and those lending money on
the strength of a financial position, as disclosed by books
of account, are acting recklessly unless they insist upon
an investigation of such financial condition in their
behalf by competent auditors.
It has also been sought to demonstrate by means of
the foregoing examples why it is necessary for proprietors and managers either to establish an efficient
system of internal audit or to employ the services of
professional auditors to go over such matters in their
behalf at reasonably frequent intervals. In this connection it is most important that the system of accounting used be so devised as to provide the proper
machinery for checking up one department against
another and to fix responsibility for the transac-
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tions recorded, the prices paid, etc. Unless this is so,
it is impossible for proprietors to supervise their affairs
adequately and useless to call in the services of professional accountants, as without such machinery it is
impossible for them, in the very nature of things, to
arrive at any definite conclusions.

TEST QUESTIONS
These questions are for the reader to use in testing
his knowledge of the lecture. The answers should be
written out fully in a notebook, but are not to be sent in.

1. With what two general classes of frauds does the accountant have to deal?
2. What does the term "internal check" mean to you ? Does
a. good system of internal check depend in any way upon the
size of a concern ?
3. What form of fraud is most frequently met, with in
auditing the accounts of a receiving cashier? As an auditor
suspecting a fraud of this character, how would you proceed
to detect it?
4. In the ease of a cashier who is also a bookkeeper, how
would you ascertain whether he has abstracted cash and charged
it to an expense account?
5. Suggest a scheme whereby the records of a storekeeper
in charge of valuable raw materials may be checked up frequently and easily by the general office.
6. In checking a cashier suspected of fraud, can you see
any stronger reasons for checking page totals that come near the
end of the month than others?
7. For what reasons is even the most scientific system of
internal check that can be devised likely to be inadequate to
disclose irregularities of a fraudulent character?
8. Indicate cases of fraud which are likely to come to light
in the ordinary course of business. Show how they will be
disclosed.
9. Why should a treasurer always be careful to initial invoices for which he has drawn checks ?
10. Suggest a system of check that will prevent padding of
pay rolls with fictitious names. In the absence of sufficient internal check, how would you as an auditor ascertain if pay roll
frauds were being perpetrated?
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TEST QUESTIONS

11. What advantages are gained by requiring that all cash
receipts be deposited each day intact, and that all payments
be made by cheek?
12. "Why is it advisable to avoid entrusting the duties of a
cashier and bookkeeper to the same individual ? Can this always
be done?
13. Specify some of the methods that a bookkeeper-cashier
may take to conceal frauds. How would you as an auditor proceed to detect these ?
14. Give reasons why frauds are sometimes committed which
disclose a false condition of business. How do such frauds compare in importance with those that simply involve theft?
15. Who are usually found to be perpetrators of such frauds
as mentioned in question 14 ?
16. In order to protect themselves, what do bankers and careful investors insist on in connection with fiscal statements?
17. Mention the chief difficulties in the way of detecting and
proving fraud in connection with inventory valuation.
18. What object might a factory superintendent have in
overvaluing an inventory and under what circumstances?
19. Suppose the general manager of a concern should
attempt to show an improvement of earnings by entering a
number of fictitious sales upon the books. How would you as
an auditor detect such fraud?
20. Why is it particularly difficult to audit the earnings
of a retail store ? How can the proprietor of such a store inflate
his sales and profits and still mate his books appear correct?
What circumstances will arouse your suspicions that such inflation had taken place ?
21. Give a number of the best reasons that occur to you
why a concern should have thorough periodic audits of its
books and records by a firm of independent and trustworthy
accountants.

